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EFFECTIVENESS OF ECOLOGICAL EDUCATION AND AWARENESS IN PUBLIC POLICY: 




Ecological safety is one of the most important challenges for the people all over the world. Remedies 
applied are often a part of public policy ad, as a rule, undermine losses of public welfare in a short-run 
to achieve environmental goals. These losses may be considered as a fee paid by society for cleaner 
environment. The aim of the state as a regulator in this context (or even a kind of its social 
responsibility) is to choose the way to better environment which guarantees a minimum public welfare 
loss. Welfare effects are construed here in microeconomic perspective – as welfare changes measured 
at the markets under regulation. Ecological education and awareness represent a rare case of regulation 
which could result in gain of public welfare. The arguments  come from theoretical analysis of situation 
when the information first unavailable is transmitted to consumers, and they change their preferences. 
Public welfare gain as a result of consumers’ awareness on NOx emission, measured at Novosibirsk 
regional energy market, could run up to 25 mln of rubles per month (regional market is based on energy 
consumption and production data). This gain of welfare could occur if consumers show rational reaction, 
which undermines a decrease of energy demand as a response on information of energy production 
externalities; or if they react at all. The second remark is crucial for regulation effect. It means that 
consumers have to consider ecological information as meaningful. These values and behavior are next to 
ecological education. As some researches show the cleaner environment is out of the priorities for 
people in Russia. Therefore Russian government has to promote ecological education. Sufficiency of 
current efforts is considered in the paper as well. 
 
Keywords 





Being a part of public policy environmental regulation is very sensible to efficiency matter. 
Its benefits sometimes are hardly to be measured and are hardly to be expected soon 
enough to be transmitted to political benefits for the authorities today. As for the costs, 
environment-friendly behavior is rather expensive thing both for the state and for the 
society. For the State it means considerable efforts (and the budget is always limited). For 
the society it results in rather restrictive changes of production and consumption patterns. 
Being painful enough to change polluters’ behavior environmental regulation affects 
domestic producers’ competitiveness which is a crucial point for the state. 
 
So if the regulator is wise enough to follow long-run benefits of cleaner environment, it is 
anxious for  environmental regulation costs efficiency. Regulation costs here mean losses in 
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public welfare which can be considered as a price of better environment for the society. The 
aim of the state as a regulator in this context (or even a kind of its social responsibility) is to 
choose the way to achieve environmental goals which guarantees a minimum public welfare 
loss. 
Public welfare is considered usually as a sum of consumers’ and producers’ net incomes 
(incomes after expenses incurred). It is measured, as a rule, in a macroeconomic way (for 
national economy).  In the meantime microeconomic analysis allows to measure welfare of 
the market actor’s as a sum of consumer and producer surpluses. The last approach seems 
to be convenient for regulation effects analysis, since the regulation often affects some of 
the markets, not all of them. Still, in most cases of environmental regulation we face the 
losses of surpluses sum. If the society cares of the environment, it can accept these losses. 
But the most interesting thing is that if the people care, they can change their preferences so 
the environmental goal can be achieved without negative welfare changes. Going further 
with the concept of consumer sovereignty it can result in eco-friendly behavior of producers 
without any substantial efforts from the state. 
 
To observe this idea more precisely we start from conventional microeconomic analysis of 
market welfare change resulting from consumer preferences alteration. We apply then this 
analysis to the case of Novosibirsk regional energy market and see how and when 
environmental regulation can bring welfare gain. Finally, we conclude whether or not 
regional or federal authorities  in Russia are doing enough to take advantage of social 
awareness as an instrument of environmental policy. 
 
 
2. Social awareness as an instrument of environmental policy: microeconomic analysis 
 
The most common environmental regulators considered in the textbooks are taxes and 
standards – as a kind of generalization for direct (administrative) and indirect (economic) 
policy instruments. Both of them, as well as many other, affect producer (polluter), which 
results to supply decrease. Conventional microeconomic analysis demonstrates then market 
welfare loss as for the case of environmental tax (Figure 1).  Transfer to the state is  Sp1DFB, 
and the welfare loss is SDEF. Compare it with the case, where consumers are informed about 
negative effect of good’s consumption or production. If they care of, they change their 
preferences, which results in demand decrease (Figure 2). We can reach the idea of welfare 
gain if we imagine the situation as following: curve D1 reflect false preferences (consumption 
under externalities ignorance), while curve D2 reflects consumers’ real preferences. 
Therefore the figure between two curves cannot be interpreted as surplus loss. It seems like 
they don’t want to buy amount Q1-Q2, but they do. So their excess expenditures are equal 









































Figure 2: Market under regulation: information campaign 
(as in Arnold, 1994) 
 
As for the producer’s side, his surplus loss is equal to the figure ACBD. All in all we have net 
gain of market welfare measured as the figure CQ1Q2F. Arnold (1994) provides more detailed 
analysis of the case. 
 
To apply this analysis to the case of Novosibirsk regional energy market, the market itself  




3. Modeling of regional energy market 
 
Modeling of demand and supply at regional energy market started with research by N. 
Suslov, A. Mishura (2003). Empirical basis for their modelling consists of monthly data on 
energy consumpltion  and prices for different groups of energy consumers within the period 
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made on monthly data of energy consumption, prices and accumulated price indexes for the 
period 1998-2003 with further adjustment to the changing structure of energy consumption. 
 
Energy prices were considered as exogenious variable, because tariffs are first fixed by 
regiobal regulator and then affect consumers decisions. As data series derived were 
nonstationary, we turned to logarithm difference. Dummy variable was introduced to meet 
seasonal changes of energy consumption. ADL model was considered for demand modeling: 
 
ttttt zzxx    11011 . 
Suppose factor tz  and error t  are stationary, then if 11   the target variable is  
stationary as well. For expectation of the equation we’ve got the following: 

















This equation describes long-run stationary condition of the process. 
 
Table 1 shows estimates of demand functions for different group of consumers. Price and 
consumption lags coefficients were calculated on data of energy prices and production in 
2005 weighted according structure of energy consumption for year 2002. 
 































































 2403.0*73.59444  tt PE  
Forestry  constEt   
727 
































































































 4412.0*13124  tt PE  

































































 4621.0*6.149882  tt PE  




 64  Journal of Economic and Social Development, Vol 1, No 2 
Regional demand function is calculated by the aggregation of individual demand functions: 
 727
ерын
E  4807.0*6.320259 tP 
 2403.0*73.59444 tP 
 1777.0*6.217187 tP 
 2831.0*53.17245 tP  
  4412.0*13124 tP 
 7814.0*01.60454 tP
4621.0*6.149882 tP .  
 
This function allows estimating energy demand per month for Novosibirsk region. 
 
Starting point for supply modeling is the idea that regional energy company is an example of 
natural monopoly. As the average cost of the company are falling while energy production 
increases, the only producer at the market operates more effectively than several 
companies. It means that regional energy operator is regulated by the state. Price policy for 
the energy is based on the level of average costs plus normal profitability. Prices vary for 
different kind of consumers, which allows realizing cross-funding for some groups of energy 
consumers. 
 
This consideration is important, because it brings us to the idea of supply function as  a 
horizontal line at the level of average costs of energy production. Analysis of market welfare 
changes resulting environmental regulation comes then to consumer surpluses difference 
before and after regulation. 
 
 
4. Environmental regulation modeling 
 
Environmental goal setting is based on the information about heat and power plants 
emissions of air pollutants and their contribution to pollution of the environment in the 
region. 
 
Heat and power plants are the main air polluters in Novosibirsk region among stationary 
sources of pollution. They generate over 20 % of air pollutant emission (see at Обзор 
состояния окружающей среды в г. Новосибирске за 2005 г. Новосибирск: мэрия г. 
Новосибирска, Городской комитет по охране окружающей среды и природным 
ресурсам). Two pollutant – NOx and benzapirene – are the most problematic for energy 
sector. Their emission causes regular violation of maximum permitted concentration (MPC). 
So hypothetical environmental goal here is 10 % reduction of NOx emission (real 
concentration of NOx near heat and power plants in Novosibirsk is about 1.1 of NOx MPC 
(Limanova, 2011, p. 153)), which means 153.5 tons of NOx reduction per month. 
 
We’re going to consider consumers’ preferences changes after information campaign. They 
are expected to reduce energy consumption as much as needed for heat and power station 
to abate 153 tons NOx per month. That’s why we need to convert NOx remission into energy 
production. The combustion of 1 kg of coal generates 4 kilowatts of power and 4 grams of 
NOx. It’s not difficult to calculate desirable decrease of energy consumption - 153 mln  of 
kilowatt-hours. 
 
Now we can imagine perfect world, where regulator knows precisely desirable parameters 
of regulation and sounds reasonable enough to convince people to act; and the people are 
eco-friendly to be convinced, they do act and they act predictable. That’s what we need to 
estimate effects of regulation. 
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5. Ecologocal awareness effect for market measured welfare 
 
As we arrived to the situation of absolute elastic supply for energy market (energy company 
provides any amount of heat and power at the price fixed by the regional authorities), let’s 
first adjust our theoretic model. 
 
 
We analyze the situation when previously unavailable information about energy 
consumption externalities is delivered to consumers. If they react, and react rationally, we 
can observe changes of their preferences, for instance, energy saving. For the case of 
absolutely elastic supply of energy at regulated price, as we see at figure 3, there is no 
producer’s surplus. For the consumers we can imagine as they buy amount Q0 at price p0 
while willing to buy amount Q1. They pay for this extra amount Q0-Q1  p0*(Q0-Q1) though 
they value it as area under D1 curve within the interval [Q1;Q0]. If the consumers adjust the 
amount to buy, they win area BCD. That’s welfare gain for this kind of market. 
 
Let’s estimate this gain if consumption decrease is 153 mln of kilowatt-hours, p0 is equal 0.91 
roubles/kilowatt-hour, Q0 is 870,5 kilowatt-hours (as it was in 2005). Net change of welfare 


























As we see, estimated welfare gain is near 25 mln. roubles monthly. This estimate is to be 
considered as upper edge for a number of reasons. First, regional demand aggregates 
different consumers’ demands, not only population, whereas information campaign is aimed 
to the people. Second, people in Russia in general do not share ecological values to get 
desirable feedback (see, for example, Blam (2005)). Third, the other (institutional) 













Figure 3: Ecological awareness effect at the market with absolute elastic supply 
 66  Journal of Economic and Social Development, Vol 1, No 2 
consumers are not interested to save energy as their clients (people) do not put eco-friendly 
behavior in claims. 
 
 
6. Concluding remark on political appropriateness 
 
Well, the truth is that ecological information as theoretically very attractive instrument for 
environmental policy, hardly to be effective for real life in Russia. To make it acting it is to 
rely on ecological values people share.  Is it possible then to grow these values? Yes, it is. As 
any other values, they can be produced by education and training. That’s why ecological 
education is crucial to the point. It is a part of public policy as well. The problem is that new 
values as a base for a new ideology are forming for a long time. It is a matter of generation, 
frankly speaking, which takes for politicians to make hard decision: to launch costly 
programs and keep going without any hope to get feedback for decade(s). 
 
How realistic is this in Russia? The legislative base favors to ecological education. It’s 
mentioned both in federal law on environmental protection and in Ministry of natural 
resources and the environment plans. Ministry report on achievements and plans for 2014-
2016 (http://www.mnr.gov.ru/regulatory/detail.php?ID=131696) is arguing that ecological 
culture and education corresponds to the Concept of long-run development for Russian 
Federation up to year 2020 adopted by Russian government in 2008. However we often face 
a gap between normative and positive sides of reality in Russia, so let’s see to the other side. 
To start with, the share of environmental protection does not exceed 0,15% of federal 
budget expenditures for last 3 years (see the structure of federal budget expenditures  
http://www.protown.ru/information/hide/6395.html), there are no ecological education or 
ecological culture mentioned within. There were no educational expenditures planned in the  
budget of the Ministry of natural resources and the environment for year 2012. For the year 
2013 the Ministry planned to spend about 4.9 mln roubles for ecological education which is 
about 0.004 % of Ministry budget. The same share is planned for year 2014. Every year I ask 
my students whether or not they had some experience in this field studying in the school. 
The answers are negative. Without exceptions. 
 
So we have to conclude that the government doesn’t spend enough efforts for ecological 
education. No wonder. If the society is not interested for something, politicians prefer to 
ignore it. Somehow it reminds a vicious circle. 
 
The positive thing is that the government really becomes more transparent. I’ve got 
response for every question addressed to governmental bodies for the last couple of years. 
In this sense the one who wish to be aware will be aware. If either society or the state would 
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